I think you all have some very interesting discussions going in these threads—especially in relation to the question of how much the responsibility for moral or immoral actions falls on either leaders or followers. I've been especially impressed by the way that many of you have managed to employ the language of Kantian morality to make important distinctions between actions that are chosen autonomously, those that are ordered heteronomously, and the effect of orders on one's conscience. Even for those of you who have disagreed with the Kantian perspective (that is, those of you who do not think that subordinates following orders should be held morally responsible for their actions), it is important for you to engage with Kant's terminology in order to show particularly where you think Kant or Arendt go wrong in their analyses. In other words, are there some circumstances in which we do not want individuals to exercise autonomous moral decision making?
This is a classic problem that hierarchical structures, like corporations, bureaucracies, and military units, confront on a day to day basis. The smooth functioning of these systems depends in large part upon subordinates following orders without questioning their validity. I was glad to see Brian post some comments about the US military's distinction of lawful vs. unlawful orders. This is a very interesting way to negotiate this tension between the need for the hierarchical body to act quickly in response to orders and the need for moral criticism of those orders. I wonder if some other participants in this forum have thoughts on that type of distinction, and whether anyone else who has some military experience might comment on that particular example of the obedience-autonomy conflict.
In connection to that topic, I also wanted to draw your attention to a short essay that Kant wrote called "What is Enlightenment?" You can find the full text of the five pages essay here: What is Enlightenment?. The whole essay is very interesting, but one passage in particular strikes me as extremely relevant to some of the discussions going on here. Kant is arguing in this essay that too many people in his times blindly obey without exercising autonomous thought. The process of becoming "enlightened," he claims, is the process of learning to use one's own reason to think about politics, morality, and even science, and in order for people to become enlightened, they must be given the freedom to think and reason without the constraints of authority. However, Kant also recognizes that this freedom cannot be absolute. There are some cases in which people need to obey authority, such as when they are soldiers in the midst of battle, or when it comes to paying taxes to the state. Kant therefore distinguishes between the "public" and "private" use of reason. Here's the full passage:
"Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters. But on all sides I hear: "Do not argue!" The officer says, "Do not argue, drill!" The tax man says, "Do not argue, pay!" The pastor says, "Do not argue, believe!"…In this we have examples of pervasive restrictions on freedom. But which restriction hinders enlightenment and which does not, but instead actually advances it? I reply: The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind; the private use of reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment. By the public use of one's own reason I understand the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world. I call the private use of reason that which a person may make in a civic post or office that has been entrusted to him. Now in many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity the government may guide them toward public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey. However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of the community as a whole, or even of the world community, and as a consequence addresses the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense of that term, he can most certainly argue, without thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible. Thus it would be disastrous if an officer on duty who was given a command by his superior were to question the appropriateness or utility of the order. He must obey. But as a scholar he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about errors in military service, or from placing them before the public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him; indeed, impertinent criticism of such levies, when they should be paid by him, can be punished as a scandal (since it can lead to widespread insubordination). But the same person does not act contrary to civic duty when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts regarding the impropriety or even injustice of such taxes."
I'm just posting this to see if you all have any other thoughts about this distinction. Do you think we must pay taxes even if we disagree with the spending practices of our government? Are we only allowed to express our disagreement in public debate? Or is it legitimate to act like Henry David Thoreau, and refuse to support a war that you don't believe in by not paying taxes? Or to act like Jim Lawson and refuse to fight in such a war? What do you think?